ABSTRACT. Ever since the colonial era, the US government has been influenced by a market-orientated intellectual tradition. Under such a tradition, an ideal social structure is a lean government in contrast to a robust private sector. The recent surge of neoliberalism has advanced the development of a market model of governance, which distinguishes itself from the traditional state-centered bureaucracy in fundamental dimensions. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the contract city, which has pursued many of the market principles to an extreme. The article traces the evolution of contract cities in California, examines closely the structure, operation, and management of contract city using the City of Highland as an example, and discusses the implications of this new form of governance for public management, organizational theory, and American political economy.
INTRODUCTION
The right balance between state and market has been a central debate in the American political economy ever since the founding of the nation. The political and economic institutions of the nation were largely shaped by two distinct intellectual traditions: the marketoriented tradition associated with Adam Smith, and the active government tradition advocated by Alexander Hamilton (Lehne, 2006) . For over two centuries, governing institutions have vacillated between state and market traditions (Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998) . In recent decades, a resurgence to market orientation has provoked many public sector reforms. Strategies have included not only reforming government to run like a business, but also introducing -
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Copyright © 2010 by Pracademics Press market mechanisms to the production and delivery of public goods and services as much as possible (Barzeley, 1992; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) . These reform efforts have contributed to the development of the so-called "market model of governance," such that a single public agency has been replaced by a mix of several purchasers and providers acting competitively to profit from increased efficiency. This new form of governance has distinguished itself from the traditional state-centered bureaucracy by substituting competition, contracts, market incentives, and consumer choice for the notions of regulation by statute, hierarchical control, duplicate layers of checking and auditing, and standardized services to citizens (Considine & Lewis, 1999 , 2003 .
As a harbinger of this new form of governance, the contract city has pursued many of these market-oriented principles to an extreme. It relies heavily on private firms, non-profit organizations, and other government agencies for most of its basic public services through contractual relationships. Although the contract city first emerged in California because of practical reasons-to avoid being annexed into large municipalities and to incorporate as an independent city-its development has been largely advanced by the surge of neoliberalism and its manifestations in public administration in recent decades.
In the following, this article first briefly reviews the resurgence of market orientation in American political economy and introduces the market model in contrast to the traditional state model of governance. It then traces the evolution of contract cities in California, examines closely the structure, operation, and management of contract cities with the City of Highland as an example. The article ends with a discussion on the implications to public management, organizational theory, and American political economy and speculation on the future development of this new form of governance.
MARKET ORIENTATION AND GOVERNMENT
Through the last three decades of the 20 th century (and possibly into the present) the world's political and economic arenas have been marked by the triumph of neoliberalism, which exalts the principles of unfettered markets even in the governing institutions. The first manifestation of this market orientation in the United States was in the middle 1970s, brought forward by the Carter administration's civil service reform initiatives, which emulated the strategies of large corporations to make government agencies subject to tougher fiscal discipline. A later development in the 1980s saw a spate of government contracting-out initiatives following the election of President Ronald Reagan (Moe, 1984) . The market-oriented reform promoted by the neoliberal ideals reached its climax in the Clinton Administration when "reinventing government" became a buzzword and parts of the public service provision system at all levels were contracted out.
Due to these reform efforts, it is noted that the "ideal" government has been transformed and a market model of governance has emerged, distinguishing itself from the traditional state-centered bureaucracy (Barzeley, 1992; Kooiman, 1993; Lowndes, 1998; Considine & Lewis, 1999 , 2003 Keast, Mandell & Brown, 2006) . This "new governance" ideal is theoretically constructed from the presumptive virtues of markets-competition, choice, and partnerships. Compared to state-centered bureaucracy, this market model of governance has a recognizable organizational character that can be viewed through the following four dimensions (Considine & Lewis, 1999 , 2003 ) (see Table 1 ).
As observed by Considine and Lewis (1999) , while the state model is called "a government of laws," market governance is defined by the central tenet of laissez-faire-competition. It responds to financial signals and competitive pressures instead of rules and protocols. Through contracts, a government of this form creates greater flexibility and reduces regulations in its control system. Unlike the state bureaucracy in which hierarchical relationships govern the behavior and agencies are mutually dependent, contractual relationships govern the behavior within market bureaucracy and each actor makes independent choices. Programs and contractors Considine and Lewis (1999) .
providing them are to be rewarded through an incentive-based system in which increased cost-efficiency results in increased reward. In addition, public support to programs or agencies is granted on market signals and consumer choice.
This market model of governance was broadly explored in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, in the UK, governments, particularly at the local level, established formalized collaborative relationships with businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and community associations not only in the fields of urban and rural regeneration, but also in social care, education, environmental and other policy sectors (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998) . Countries like Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were also in the leading edge of developing this new form of government (Aucoin, 1990; Shand, 1996; Kettl, 1997) . Recent development of this market bureaucracy includes the creation of a variety of "quasi markets" for public services in the areas of health, welfare, and education (Walford, 1996; Spall, McDonald, & Zetlin, 2004) . In the US, the application of the market model of governance has not only been identified in recent writings on postbureaucratic organization (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Kettl 1993 Kettl , 2000 , but also was evident in emergent structures in federal, state, and local governments (Warner & Hefetz 2004 ).
In the hope of shining some light on this new form of government, this article introduces the case of the contract city, which, unintentionally and intentionally, has adopted many of the doctrines of this market model of governance to an extreme.
The term "contract city" has been used loosely to refer to a city which has a contract with a private firm, a non-profit organization, or another government agency for various governmental services. Cities have traditionally entered into contracts for public services like garbage collection and water services, or for services incidental to government, such as facilities and grounds maintenance, auditing, legal counsel, road construction, and engineering services. Beginning with the Reagan era, and driven by the worldwide privatization movement, contracts between cities and public, private, and nonprofit sectors have both sharply increased in number and widely expanded their service areas. However, cities generally do not contract with another entity for basic governmental services, such as police, fire, library, and city management.
In the context of this paper, "contract city" refers to a specific type of city in the state of California that has contracted out most of its basic governmental services to other governments or private entities. The term is used in contrast with "general service city" or, in some instances, "independent city,"¹ where basic governmental services are provided by the city itself. A contract city could not be termed "independent" because of its reliance on other government entities for municipal services. While most general service cities are older cities, almost all contract cities in California are cities that incorporated no earlier than the second half of the last century. Though these cities may contract out almost all of their public services, they usually do their own land-use planning since the cities were originally incorporated to exert local control over land use.
CONTRACT CITIES IN CALIFORNIA
The history of the contract city started with Lakewood, California, in 1954 (California Contract Cities Association, Undated). For about a decade before Lakewood became a city, post-war migration had boosted the population of Los Angeles County's unincorporated areas from 444,741 in 1940 to 1,150,570 by 1954. Much of the new growth was concentrated in new communities, like Lakewood, with neighborhoods of new homes, commercial centers, and growing industrial areas ready for possible city incorporation. The rapidly developing communities made the County worry that a rash of new city incorporations could decimate County departments through greatly reduced workloads. Meanwhile, residents in the unincorporated areas preferred to maintain the existing services provided by County government, but at the same time wanted to enjoy more local control.
In this venue, the so-called "Lakewood Plan" was crafted, which provided an economical way to incorporate, but retained the growing Lakewood community as an LA County service area through contracts with the County. For the communities, ready, well-staffed service departments were already in place, and there was no need for heavy capital investment in new municipal facilities. For the County, the new cities offered potential sources of revenue with the contract services as a profit-making venture. The Lakewood Plan thus laid the foundation for newly incorporated cities in California and this "contract city" form of municipal government became known nationally and gained widespread acclaim.
Meanwhile in 1955, the state legislature adopted the Uniform Sales Tax, which opened the financial door for many communities that had a sufficient commercial or industrial base to produce a level of tax revenue sufficient to support cityhood within the guidelines of the contract system. Within six years, 25 more cities were incorporated. Among these earliest cities were Dairy Valley (now Cerritos), Downey (the only city to leave the contract system after its first years of existence), and La Originally, cities that contracted with counties had been smaller, suburban cities, often with lower service demands. They usually contracted with counties to incorporate as a city while avoiding heavy taxation of their residents (Miller, 1981) . In recent years, however, larger, more traditional, general-service cities have begun to contract with counties, including cities such as Pomona, for fire services, and Compton, for police services. 2 These cities have contracted with their respective counties as a cost-saving measure rather than as a means of tax avoidance or annexation, since budget constraints have made contract relationships with the counties more attractive (Hoene, Baldassare, & Shir, 2002) . As of 2007, though no accurate number of contract cities exists either at the state or national level because of the problem of definition; it is estimated that in California alone there are approximately over seventy contract cities. 3 In the following section, this article uses the City of Highland as a case in point to illustrate the operations of a contract city and discusses the challenges and implications to public administration of this market model of government.
THE CITY OF HIGHLAND 4
Highland is a contract city with a population of 52,186 (as of 2007) and a land area of approximately 15 square miles. Highland is located in San Bernardino County, one of the fastest growing regions in the United States. Founded as a town-site in 1891, the City was incorporated as a California General Law City in November of 1987. It follows a city council-manager form of government with the City Manager appointed by the City Council.
Highland's modern history began in the 1850s with the Cram brothers' discovery of soil that produced excellent oranges. They began to plant many of the groves that are still in existence today. The area became a well-known citrus region and remained so until the 1930s when recession hit the citrus industry and the railroad ceased operation. The citrus industry never fully recovered in the area, and the community grew slowly over the next 20 to 30 years.
In the early 1980s, Highland embraced a big change when Mobil Oil started the construction of East Highland Ranch in the area. The Ranch contains over 1,760 acres with 2,760 dwelling units. Because of the construction, many areas beside the Ranch became desirable housing options for first-time and upscale home buyers. The rural atmosphere and unique location, proximate both to the mountains and to large cities, made the City an ideal bedroom community.
The development of the bedroom community led to a rapid increase of population in Highland and led to the incorporation of the City in 1987. Before its incorporation, Highland had relied on San Bernardino County and special districts for various public services. Counties in California usually establish various special districts explicitly for the purpose of providing a specific service to an area within the county. Such special districts provide a wide range of services, including fire protection, libraries, sewer services and maintenance, street lighting and landscaping, flood control, and storm drainage maintenance. Some of the special districts, especially larger ones such as fire and library districts, are governed either directly by the board of supervisors or indirectly by a county department under the control of the board of supervisors. After incorporation, the City of Highland started to contract with the county and special districts for those services normally provided by a city government.
Highland as a Contract City
As a contract city, Highland operates with an extremely lean personnel of 36 full-time employees (FTEs) serving a community of over 50,000 people. 5 The City provides a wide range of services, including administrative, community development, public safety, public works, and other services, in large part through contracting with other governmental agencies, private firms, non-profit organizations, and individual volunteers (see Table 2 ). Though most public works services are handled through City Hall, inspections and plan checking of engineering services, major overlays and projects for street maintenance, as well as various special maintenance services are contracted to private firms. In addition, some public works activities, such as community clean-ups, blood drives, and public safety appreciation week, are provided by volunteers.
Other services, including gas, electric, water and sewer, refuse disposal, cable TV, library, vector control, and public transportation, are provided to the citizens by the private sector, special districts, and the County of San Bernardino without the City's direct supervision.
To fund all these services, Highland largely relies on revenues from various taxes as well as intergovernmental revenue received from other governmental entities. Beside property tax, sales and use tax, licenses and permits fees, and other taxes, the City collects a variety of franchise fees, including fees for gas, electric, cable, refuse, kiosk signs, and household hazardous waste, from persons, firms, and corporations. Intergovernmental revenue ranges from the distribution of vehicle license fees to federal grants that are administered through the county. Vehicle license fees, combining amounts received from both the state and the county, are the City's biggest revenue source. As of FY 2007-2008, about half of Highland's revenue was intergovernmental revenue.
Compared to traditional, general-services cities, in which employees' salaries and benefits count for a large portion of a city's expenditures, the City of Highland spends less than 5% in this category. Over a third of Highland's expenditure is for contractual services (see Figure 1) . Table 3 offers a comparison between the City of Highland, a contract city, and the City of Colton, a general service city, both in San Bernardino County. Though each is similar in population, the City of Highland operates at a much lower budget level for both outsourced services and internal administrative services. 
Contract City as Market Model of Governance
As a harbinger of the market model of governance, the contract city has gained some research attention and is highly related to some major contemporary debates. It substitutes competition, contracts, market incentives, and consumer choice for the traditional notions of regulation by statute, hierarchical control, duplicated layers of checking and auditing, and standard services to citizens. Its experience points to the growing importance of issues such as intergovernmental relations, management capacity, accountability to citizens, and equal treatments.
Competition vs. Contention
First, rather than competition, the contract city has created tension and contention among local governments. Contract cities have to rely on the local service provision network, which consists of a large array of county and city governments, service districts, and private or nonprofit organizations. While contract cities enjoy efficiencies in service provision by reducing administrative overhead and service redundancy, general service cities point to contract cities as "free riders" on county services. They argue that their residents unfairly subsidize the overhead costs of providing contract services because the overhead costs for those services are legally prohibited from being passed on to contract cities. 6 In California, a group of general service cities have jointly filed a series of legal suits against contract cities and counties. In addition, the county-city contracts make it possible for small cities to be incorporated in counties rather than near larger, neighboring cities. Opponents of contract cities argue that county and special district provision of public services contributed to the decline of the role of central cities and the fragmentation of metropolitan areas (Sbragia, 1996) . If the contract city is the future model of municipal government, it will challenge the traditionally mandated roles of local governments and demand more constitutional justification.
Contracts vs. Management Capacity
Second, using contractual obligation as a control mechanism, the management of a contract city requires competence beyond that of the traditional public administrator. In the traditional rule-bound bureaucracy, the existence of duplicated layers of checking and auditing reduces the likelihood of large errors. The replacement of internal rules with contracts may increase the possibility for many of the principal-agent pitfalls, such as distortion, goal displacement, and moral hazard, demanding more management capacity for intensive supervision and monitoring. In the City of Highland, a large part of the City Manager's job is to negotiate contracts, ensure the continuity of service provisions, and collaborate with a large array of service providers, over which he has no direct control. Instead of resolving crucial management issues, the city manager largely acts as a contract administrator and monitor. This new form of government highlights the importance of the capacities and skills that governments need in order to operate in a vastly different landscape: they include contract specification, negotiation and bargaining, monitoring and evaluation as outlined by a plethora of books and articles on contracting out (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006) .
Cost-efficiency vs. Local Control
Third, contract cities, while enjoying the efficiency of service provision, pay the price in local control. The provision of public service through contract relationships with counties, special districts, and private and non-profit entities is more efficient than what can be offered by local cities acting on their own. Services, such as water and sewer, fire, and police are more easily provided at the regional level and on a large scale. Contract cities potentially have access to more services, services with higher quality, and, in the case of emergency, a larger pool of resources than cities that operate alone. For example, when the Old Fire of 2003 raged out of control in the mountain range adjacent to the City of Highland, over 140 law enforcement personnel from other stations of the county sheriff's office and surrounding agencies were on-scene to assist with evacuations and traffic control within minutes. However, those opposed to contract cities point out that a city's reliance on other entities could lead to a decline in local representation and inflexibility to meet community needs. How to implement local control and hold contractors accountable to local residents are among the growing challenges for contract cities.
Commercial Feasibility vs. Equity Concerns
Lastly, with an emphasis on commercial feasibility in service provision decisions, the contract city aggravates the disparity of service provision among jurisdictions. This controversy contains two arguments. First, being responsive to market signals and consumer choice, decision makers in a market model of governance would let the market determine the number of channels available to achieve a goal. In addition to cost and quality, the existence of vendors defines the range of feasible strategies. It has been noted that most contract cities provide a very limited range of public services. Like the City of Highland, they are often exempt from a whole array of human services, such as public education, public health, child welfare, seniors programs, etc., because of the complex financial, political, and social problems and implications attached to such services. Second, since the level of service provided is negotiated rather than standardized, public service providers may end up with disparate level of services to citizens in contract cities and those in their own jurisdiction. For example, the City of Highland often offers financial incentives to their service providers in all sectors to encourage better performance. This practice opens the door for public employees in vendor organizations to potentially treat contract cities more favorably (or vice versa), as contracting connotes greater financial gain to both the organization and the individual employees.
In sum, a number of concerns have been raised about this new form of governance. However the persistent pursuit for government efficiency has been continuously fueling the evolution of the contract city. Although contract cities may not be uniformly welcomed, this form of government offers an entrepreneurial alternative to serve the public in ways that are affecting the practices of municipalities nationwide.
THE FUTURE OF THE CONTRACT CITY
Despite the controversies, contract cities have survived for around half a century and new adherents of this market-oriented model of government continue to emerge. Generally speaking, two forces have contributed to the emergence and, later, the proliferation of contract cities in California. One is the increased demand for municipal-level services as a result of urbanization and suburbanization, which refer to the phenomenon that increasing populations in and surrounding metropolitan areas leads to displacement of central cities as the key provider of public services (Berman, 1993) . The other is the increasing reliance of government on other entities to provide public service as driven by the many public sector reform efforts along the neoliberalism line. It is unlikely that these two forces will diminish or reverse in the near future.
Recent cases also demonstrate that the contract city will be continuously explored as a viable government form for public service provision. For example, county-city contracts have been adopted in many other states, such as New York, Florida, and Georgia, by newly incorporated municipalities. Likewise, many public entrepreneurs have gone beyond government-to-government contracting for public services that are traditionally considered "core government services." For example, the City of Weston, Florida, incorporated in 1996, has pursued this market model to an extreme. The city of over 60,000 residents operates with only three public employees, a city manager, an assistant city manager, and a city clerk. All city services except for those handled by the three in-house employees are contracted out (Prager, 2008) . In 2005, the City of Sandy Springs, Georgia, a newly incorporated city, hired a private company to operate and manage all city services except fire, police, and 911. The city of almost 100,000 residents has only four employees besides police officers and firefighters. Two years later, two other newly formed cities in the same state also entered into contracts with the same private city management company for their day-to-day services.
Having briefly examined the operations of contract cities in California and the current development of contract cities, can one conclude that this new form of governance will replace the state model and be the dominant type of governance in the future? Given the intrinsic limitations of contract cities, I believe this market model of governance will at most supplement the traditional form of government because contract cities must rely on other governmental units for core government services.
It is important to note that most contract cities either in California or other states are generally newly incorporated cities; they often start with "a clean slate" (Prager, 2008, p. 178) . Though there are instances of general service cities' evolving into contract cities, it is often extremely difficult for governments engaging in such practices to divest services. They are likely to encounter political resistance from existing stakeholders both inside and outside the organization.
In addition, the geopolitical environment that has nurtured the proliferation of contract cities in California is less likely to exist in other places. California has a strong county system in public service provision. California counties generally have large populations and governmental structures as compared to most US counties. As counties have been continuously driven by urbanization and suburbanization in the past several decades, they are subsequently confronted with meeting the demands of increasingly large and diverse populations. They respond by expanding their roles as municipal service provision centers through mechanisms such as special districts and contractual agreements with cities. Because of population size, contract cities are likely surrounded by clusters of cities or are located near large municipalities, which are also municipal service providers. In addition, due to the sizable market, multiple private service providers also exist across jurisdictions. The existence of this municipal service network, or "quasi market," with providers from different levels of government and across sectors not only makes public service accessible but also facilitates competition to the advantage of contract cities. For example, the City of Highland can choose animal control service from either San Bernardino County or from the nearby city of Redlands. If the service provided does not meet its performance requirements, the City can easily shift vendors or negotiate a new contract with another vendor. Similar geopolitical features are also found in other states with contract cities. However, such service provision networks are less likely to exist in states with a weak county system or in rural counties, and thus the lessons of contract cities may not be applicable elsewhere.
Overall, it is unlikely that this market model of governance will be widely pursued to its extreme. Instead, a mixed model of governance may provide a more adaptive and flexible response to institutional needs.
CONCLUSION
For centuries, governing institutions have been bound up in a continuous oscillation between state intervention and contractual market exchanges. The pendulum, though it has been pushed by the upsurge of neoliberalism further toward the market, will unlikely remain static, or in stable, constant equilibrium. The contract city case provides a unique opportunity to understand the market model of governance and its components. From this assessment several additional lessons for public practitioners stand out for pursuing this market model:
First, public managers need to understand that the market model (as exemplified by the contract city) is not one-size-fit-all. The recent upsurge of the market model has its historical and social roots; yet whether or not and to which degree a public organization shall pursue this market orientation should respond to the specific institutional and environmental conditions. In the absence of an integrated and competitive service market and/or the presence of a committed civil service and organized labor force, it is not wise to pursue the model to its extreme as the contract city has done. Alternatively, in-house or mixed service provisions could be more cost-effective.
Second, public managers need to realize that the market model is a double-edged sword and its institutional and environmental implications demand serious and comprehensive assessment. Though the market model has been exalted by reform advocates for decades, empirical studies generally found mixed impacts of government contracts. While embracing efficiency, choice, and flexibility, the market model may significantly alter intergovernmental relations, raise serious equity and government capacity concerns, and threaten democratic control. Public managers need to understand intrinsic limitations of the market model and fully assess the tradeoffs between different service provision choices in the decision to pursue the market orientation.
Lastly, public managers need to renew their knowledge base in order to successfully implement, operate, and sustain a contract city. In pursuing the market model public managers are facing challenges of managing increasingly sophisticated contractual relations in joint service markets to meet various levels of citizen demand for service and acceptance for indirect control. In addition to nontraditional knowledge on contract design, solicitation, negotiation, supervision, and evaluation, public managers need to learn how to coordinate with contractors with different interests in the joint pursuit of organizational goals, objectives, and measurements and how to balance the trade-offs among characteristics of service, market, client, and agent (Van Slyke, 2006) .
The lessons learned are expected to help public practitioners strike a balance between the state and market models and to make judicious selection of their elements to achieve optimal outcomes of governance. NOTES 1. A more common usage of "independent city" refers to a city that is not part of any county.
2. Both Pomona and Compton have a population of over 100,000.
3. The number is estimated based on cities that contract out at least one public safety service (either law enforcement or fire). Source: Joseph Hughes, the City Manager of Highland. 6. The State of California Legislature passed the Gonsalves Act (Government Code Section 51350) in 1967, which prohibits counties from charging certain overhead costs in providing contract services to cities.
